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REPORTS OF CASES 
DETERMINED IN 
THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
[39 C.2d 1; 243 P.2d 789] 
[Sac. No. 6139. In Bank. May 71 1952.] 
R. L. EBERHARDT et al., Appellants, v. ARTHUR C. 
BASS et al., Respondents. 
[1] Chattel Mortgages-Construction and Operation-Crop Mort-
gage.-Defendant's interest as mortgagee of lessee's asparagus 
crops growing and to be grown through the 1955 season does 
not expire on termination of the lease for lessee's default 
where a subordination agreement, signed by plaintiffs as 
lessors, specifically states that all claims of plaintiffs against 
, lessee, which could include a rig;ht to terminate the lease, and 
all plaintiffs' interest in or claim against any of the asparagus 
crops, which may reasonably embrace the right to crops to 
be grown that plaintiffs would acquire by terminating the 
lease, are subject and subordinate to defendant's rights against 
lessee under any crop contract or mortgage to have the crops 
to be grown as security for the debt owed by lessee to de-
fendant. 
[2a, 2b] !d.-Construction and Operation-Crop Mortgage.-Where 
a subordination agreement, signed by lessors entitled to re-
ceive from lessee a rental of one-fourth of all crops grown 
during tenancy, gives defendant the right to exercise· all of 
its rights under nny crop mortgage, if lessee should breach the 
lease, the same as if the lease had not been breached, and 
permits it to take possession of all crops and dispose of them 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Chattel Mortgages, § 21; Am.Jur., Chattel 
Mortgages, § 134. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-5, 81 9] Chattel Mortgages,§ 49; [6, 7] 
Crops, § 3. 
39 C.2d-1 ( 1) 
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for the "term of said lease" provided it abides by the lease, 
the quoted words do not necessarily mean that if the lease was 
terminated such rights would cease, but may mean that such 
rights might be exercised for the period covered by the lease. 
[3] !d.-Construction and Operation-Crop Mortgage.-Where a 
subordination agreement, signed by lessors entitled to receive 
from lessee a rental of one-fourth of all crops grown during 
tenancy, expressly provides that if the realty should be relet, 
sublet, sold or encumbered before the rights of defendant 
under a crop mortgage terminate, the lessors agree that any 
new lease and any deed or other conveyance shall recognize 
the agreement subordinating lessee's right to defendant's rights 
under the crop mortgage, the inference is that a termination 
of the original lease is not to end defendant's rights. 
[4] !d.-Construction and Operation-Crop Mortgage.-A provi-
sion in a subordination agreement, signed by lessors entitled 
to receive from lessee a rental of one-fourth of all crops grown 
during tenancy, that if defendant takes possession in the 
exercise of its rights under a crop mortgage after lessee has 
breached the lease it must perform the terms of the lease while 
in possession, may reasonably indicate defendant's duties if 
it chooses to take possession as an alternative means of pro-
tecting its superior rights under the agreement subordinating 
lessee's right to defendant's rights under the crop mortgage, 
and not as a restriction on those rights if it does not choose 
to take possession. 
[6] !d.-Construction and Operation-Crop Mortgage.-A provi-
sion in a subordination agreement, signed by lessors entitled 
to receive from lessee a rental of one-fourth of all crops grown 
during tenancy, that lessee's interest in the crops might be 
sold or mortgaged to defendant, while some indication that 
only such i.nterest might be sold or mortgaged and that on 
termination of the lease there would be no interest to mortgage 
or sell, does not necessarily negative that part of the agree-
ment subordinating lessee's right to defendant's rights under 
a crop mortgage, nor conclusively show that the crop to be 
grown was not to be subject to the indebtedness for as long 
as the term and renewal period of the lease. 
[Sa, 6b-] Crops-Sales-Contracts-Construction and Operation.-
Contracts signed by lessors and lessee stating that they have 
"sold" to defendant all the asparagus to be grown on the 
leased property during the seasons of 1947 to 1955 do not 
terminate with termination of the lease for lessee's default, 
although a letter written by defendant's counsel during the 
preliminary negotiations referred to the purchase of the crops 
to be grown during the term of the lease, where the contracts 
are expressly made to run to 1955, and where a subordination 
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agreement, executed at the same time and signed by lessors, 
specifically states that all claims of lessors against lessee are 
subject and subordinate to defendant's rights against lessee 
under any crop mortgage to have the crops to be grown as 
security for the debt owed by lessee to defendant. 
[7] !d.-Sales-Contracts-Construction and Operation.-Asserted 
ambiguities in contracts of sale of lessee's asparagus crops, 
such as that lessors, who were entitled to receive only one-
fourth of the crops during tenancy, could not have been the 
seller of the crop and pass title thereto when they did not 
have it, and the statement that there were no encumbrances 
on the crops when there were, does not compel the court to 
ignore the clear and positive provisions of the contracts that 
lessors and lessee have sold to defendant all the asparagus to 
be gi'own on the leased property through the 1955 season. 
[8] Chattel Mo1'tgages-Construction and Operation-Crop Mort-
gage.-Where a crop mortgage embracing 75 per cent of the 
"crops of asparagus to be grown" by lessee on leased property 
was assigned to defendant, and lessors, who were entitled to 
25 per cent of all crops grown during tenancy, signed a 
subordination agreement specifically stating that all claims of 
lessors against lessee were subject to and subordinate to 
defendant's rights against lessee under any crop contract or 
mortgage to have the crops to be grown as security for the 
debt owed by lessee to defendant, and both lessors and lessee 
signed contracts selling to defendant all the asparagus to be 
groWn on the leased property through the 1955 season, it is 
proper to decree that defendant may retain 75 per cent of the 
amounts to be paid by it for asparagus under the contracts 
until it has been reimbursed for the mortgaged indebtedness. 
[9] Id. - Construction and Operation- Crop Mortgage.-A refi-
nancing arrangement consisting of defendant's mortgage of 
lessee's asparagus crop, a subordination agreement signed by 
lessors subordinating their claims against lessee to defendant's 
rights against lessee under any crop contract or mortgage 
to have the crops to be grown as security for the debt owed 
·by lessee _to defendant, and contracts of sale by lessors and 
lessee making defendant the owner of the asparagus crops to 
be grown on the leased property through the 1955 season, is 
not unfair and unconscionable and a lien may be equitably 
imposed to enforce such arrangement beyond the terms of 
the lease whete, looking at the whole transaction, the lessors 
received value, it _appearing that the original indebtedness 
was incurred to establish the asparagus crop, of which lessors 
were to rec11ive. 25 per -cent, and that by the refinancing ar-
.r&.!lge:!Ae~~ the debt beca~e less and the contracts were made 
to assure lessors and lessee of a certain market. 
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Joaquin County. George F. Buck, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to quiet title to land and crops. Judgment that 
plaintiffs owned land, and that defendant corporation owned 
crops to be grown in accordance with contracts and had lien 
on crops and on land, affirmed. 
Rutherford, Jacobs, Cavalero & Dietrich, D. R. Jacobs and 
William H. Woodward for Appellants. 
Price, MacDonald & Knox, Mazzera, Snyder & DeMartini 
and Wallace W. Knox for Respondents. 
CARTER, J.- In 1943, Empire Tract Company, as owner 
and lessor, leased to R. C. MacLean, lessee, a tract of farm 
land for the purpose of growing asparagus for a 10-year term, 
commencing .January, 1943, with an option for two years 
more; the rental was 25 per cent of the asparagus grown. 
In 1943, MacLean planted asparagus. In 1944, MacLean, with 
the consent of the lessor, assigned his lease to defendant, 
Arthur C. Bass, who assumed MacLean's obligations under 
the lease. In September, 1944, Bass, with the lessor's con-
sent, gave a crop mortgage on the asparagus crop to Rich-
mond-Chase Company, the latter having financed tlie planting 
of the asparagus. In 1945, plaintiffs acquired title to the land 
subject to the lease. In 1947, Bass needed refinancing, which 
was obtained from defendant, Stokely Foods, Inc., and the 
rights and duties involved were set forth in agreements be-
tween the defendants and plaintiffs. 
Upon a breach of the lease in 1949 by Bass, plaintiffs gave 
notice to defendants, and the default not having been cured, 
plaintiffs commenced the instant action against defendants 
to quiet title to the land and crops and sought to have it 
declared that defendants no longer had any interest in the 
land or asparagus crop. Defendant Bass defaulted, but 
Stokely asserted in detail its rights under the agreements. 
The court decreed, as we construe it, that Stokely shall be 
the owner of the asparagus crops to be grown through the 1955 
season, when grown, in accordance with the asparagus con-
tracts (hereafter mentioned) which were declared to be in full 
force; that plaintiffs are the owners of the land; that Stokely 
has a lien (to secure $47,893.19 due from Bass) on 75 per 
cent of the crops to be grown through 1955; -that until the 
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rights of Stokely under the subordination agreement (here-
after mentioned) and the asparagus contracts have termi-
nated, any new lease or conveyance of the land shall be 
subject to such agreements, and a lien is imposed upon the 
land to that extent; that the liens are to exist until the 
indebtedness is paid or 1955, whichever arrives first. 
Plaintiffs appeal, urging two main contentions: That the 
1947 agreement properly interpreted, as a matter of law, 
does not alter the general rule that a termination by the 
lessor of the lease for default, ended the security interest 
of Stokely in the crops, and that if the agreement does alter 
the rule, it is unconsciomible and unfair and should not have 
been enforced in equity. 
The · 1943 lease provided that the lessor shall receive as 
''rental'' for the property 25 per cent of all asparagus crops 
produced thereon during the term of the lease and renewals, 
to be delivered on the premises, and lessor to bear 25 per cent 
of the cost of packing the annual crop; lessee is to establish 
the crop (which has a normal life of 10 to 12 years); time is 
of the essence, and lessor may, upon 10 days' notice, terminate 
the lease for a breach of any of its terms by lessee. The crop 
mortgage to Richmond-Chase in 1944, embraced 75 per cent 
of the ''crops of asparagus growing and to be grown,'' from 
October, 1944, to June, 1955, and was to secure $40,000 and 
further sums advanced and was consented to by the lessor ; as 
a part of the transaction, MacLean assigned the lease to Bass 
and was released from all liability under the lease and his 
indebtedness to Richmond-Chase. An advance was made to 
Bass under the mortgage and he borrowed money from a bank, 
secured by his farm equipment during 1944-46. Finding 
himself in financial difficulties in 1947, Bass, without any 
participation by plaintiffs, approached Stokely to have it 
refinance him; his indebtedness then amounted to about $72,-
000. Stokely was receptive, and its counsel, Mr. Knox, ad-
vised plaintiff, Eberhardt, by letter that Stokely would ac-
quire the Richmond-Chase crop mortgage and would advance 
Bass funds to pay the debt on the equipment; that in return 
it wanted to buy from Bass all the cannllig asparagus grown 
during the term of the lease ; and that proper documents for 
its security and a new crop mortgage be made and a memo-
randum of the lease recorded. Enclosed were two proposed 
contracts, one for the purchase of canning white asparagus 
and tb,e other green asparagus, called asparagus contracts, 
. also a ''Subordination Agreement.'' Eberhardt's counsel sug-
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gested changes in the latter agreement: (1) To the effect that 
if Bass defaulted and Stokely entered the leased property, 
Stokely would assume Bass' obligations, and (2) the lessors' 
rental of 25 per cent of the crops be excepted from the agree-
ment. The subordination agreement and canning asparagus 
purchase contracts were signed by plaintiffs. Thereafter 
Richmond-Chase assigned its mortgage to Stokely. 
The subordination agreement recites that plaintiffs are 
the owners of the land and of the lessors' interest in rentals 
to become due under the lease which is in full force; and 
that Stokely, under the terms of the agreement, is willing 
to loan money to Bass to finance him in the asparagus project 
under the lease. It then provided that in consideration of 
the loan by Stokely to Bass, plaintiffs "[3] agree that all 
claims of the [plaintiffs] against said ... Bass, except for 
rental as provided in said lease, and any and all of the [plain-
tiff's] interest in or to, or claims against, any of the aspar-
agus crops, except for rental as provided in said lease, shall 
be subject and subordinate to the claims of Stokely Foods, 
Inc., against said [Bass] lessee and against said crops under 
any crop contract and any crop mortgage the lessee [Bass] 
. . . may execute and deliver to Stokely Foods, Inc., cover-
ing said asparagus a:p.d shall be subject and subordinate to 
the claims of Stokely Foods, Inc., as assignee of Richmond-
Chase Company, . . . under that certain crop mortgage exe-
cuted by . . . Bass, dated September 30, 1944, . . . . 
" [ 4] Should the lessee [Bass] breach or abandon said lease 
or do or cause anything to be done whereby he might or 
would lose possession of said land, the [plaintiffs] hereby 
agree to permit Stokely . . . to exercise all rights which it 
has under any crop contract andjor any crop mortgage as 
if lessee had not breached said lease or had remained in 
possession, as the case may be, and agree that Stokely . . . 
will be permitted to take possession of said crops and dis-
pose of them as provided in said crop contract and/or crop 
mortgage for a period not exceeding the term of said lease, 
provi~ed while Stokely . . . is in possession of the demised 
premises it shall perform all of lessee's [Bass'] agreements 
as set forth in said lease. 
"[5] If said real property should be relet, sublet, sold or 
encumbered before the rights of Stokely . . . under said con-
tract or crop mortgage· terminate, the [plaintiffs] further 
agree that any new lease to the same lessee or to any other 
person and any deed or other conveyance or mortgage or 
May 1952] EBERHARDT v. BASS 
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deed of trust of said real property shall contain a provision 
expressly recognizing the agreements herein provided for and 
subordinating the right of the lessee or transferee to the 
rights of Stokely . . . under any crop contract, any crop 
mortgage, and hereunder. 
'' [ 6) In said lease it is provided that lessors shall be en-
titled to receive 25% of all of the crops of asparagus pro-
duced on said land during the term of said lease as rental 
and that lessor may elect to dispose of its said percentage 
through lessee. The [plaintiffs] hereby agree that they have 
this day sold their share of said crops of canning asparagur 
to Stokely . . . and that they will not elect to permit lessee 
to dispose of said canning asparagus. 
"[7] The [plaintiffs] hereby consent to the assignment by 
lessee of said lease to Stokely . . . for the purpose of secur-
ing any indebtedness of said ... Bass (including said Rich-
mond-Chase crop mortgage) and the [plaintiffs] further con-
sent to the sale and/or mortgage by said . . . Bass of his 
interest therein to Stokely . . . of the canning asparagus 
growing and to be grown upon the demised premises. 
"[8] In the event lessee [Bass] defaults in any obligation 
contained in said lease, before exercising any rights con-
tained in said lease, the undersigned agree to give Stokely 
. . . written notice thereof . . . and to give it ten days within 
which to cure said default before exercising any right of 
reentry, cancellation or termination of said lease, it being 
understood that so long as said lease is assigned to Stokely 
. . . the bap.kruptcy or insolvency of said . . . Bass shall 
not be a ground for termination of said lease.'' 
In 1949, two years after the subordination agreement, Bass 
having failed to operate the property as reqmred by the 
lease, plaintiffs gave notice to him and Stokely of its termina-
tion. The default not being cured, plaintiffs entered into 
possession of the property and commenced the instant action. 
[1] Commencing with the premise that the interest of 
a crop mortgagee under a mortgage on crops to be grown, 
given by the lessee as mortgagor on the latter's share of the 
crops, expires when the lease is terminated for the default 
of the lessee, plaintiffs urge that the subordination agree-
ment does not negative the application of that rule; that 
therefore Stokely's interest was lost when the lease was 
terminated for Bass' default and their title should have been 
quieted against Stokely. 
I· 
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The subordination agreement, as above seen, specifically 
states that all claims of plaintiffs against Bass, which could 
include a right to terminate the lease, and all plaintiffs' in-
t erest in or claim aga-inst any of the asparagus crops, which 
may reasonably embrace the right to crops to be grown that 
plaintiffs would acquire by terminating the lease, are sub-
ject and subordinate, that is, inferior to Stokely's rights 
against Bass under any crop contract or mortgage, that is, 
the right to have the crops to be grown as security for the 
debt owed by Bass to Stokely. [2a] In harmony with that 
construction, and implementing it, Stokely is given the right 
to exercise all of its rights under any crop mortgage, if Bass 
should breach the lease, the same as if the lease had not been 
breached, and may take possession of all crops and dispose 
of them for the term of the lease, provided it abides by the 
lease. While the expression that the rights under the con-
tracts might be exercised for the term of the lease may be 
susceptible of the meaning that if the lease was terminated 
the rights would cease, it may also be susceptible of the 
meaning that such rights might be exercised for the period 
covered by the lease, 10 years plus two one-year renewals. 
To that end plaintiffs must give Stokely notice of any breach 
of the lease by Bass. This might indicate that Stokely's 
rights are restricted to Bass' but not necessarily so by reason 
of the other terms of the contracts. [3] Moreover, if con-
ditions should change, such as a reletting, subletting, selling 
or an encumbering before Stokely's rights under the crop 
mortgage end, any such new arrangements should recognize 
the rights of Stokely. A reletting m:eans a new ·lease which 
embraces a termination of the Bass lease, hence the inference 
is that the termination of the Bass lease is not to end 
Stokely's rights. 
Plaintiffs urge, however, that the changes made at their 
request, in the subordination agreement, before its execu-
tion, shows a contrary intent. The first change was that 
made in paragraph four. As proposed, it read, after the 
last use of the word mortgage, ''during all of the years cov-
ered thereby,'' and the change in lieu of that provides as 
it does ''for a period etc.'' They claim that the former 
clause would cover the crops for the years to 1955 mentioned 
in the crop mortgage, but the change fixed the period for 
the term of the lease, which might be less if terminated 
by plaintiffs. If their theory is correct that ordinarily a 
crop mortgage dies with the lease, the originally proposed 
May 1952] EBERHARDT v. BASS 
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words might not have the meaning they claim. [2b] As 
above seen, the expression used, ''term of said lease,'' may 
well mean the years expressed on its face as its life. [ 4] There 
was also added to the paragraph the provision that if Stokely 
did take possession it must perform the terms of the lease 
while in possession. This may reasonably indicate Stokely's 
duties if it chose to take possession as an alternative means 
of protecting its superior rights given by the forepart of 
the agreement and not as a restriction on those rights if it 
did not choose to take possession. 
[5] The second change, in paragraph seven, consisted of 
the addition of the words "by Arthur C. Bass, of his interest 
therein to Stokely" after the last use of the word mortgage. 
There may be some indication that only Bass' interest in 
the crops might be sold or mortgaged and thus when the lease 
was terminated there would be no interest to mortgage or 
sell, but it does not necessarily negative the forepart of the 
lease. It may be that plaintiffs intended by this amendment 
to prevent a holding out of themselves as guarantors of Bass 
to the full extent of the crops, including their 25 per cent 
as lessors, but it does not conclusively show that the crop 
to be grown was not to be subject to the indebtedness for 
as long as the 10-year term and renewal period of the lease. 
[6a] Plaintiffs urge that the contracts (called asparagus 
contracts) under 'vhich the asparagus crops were to be sold 
to Stokely, terminated with the termination of the lease. As 
heretofore shown, the subordination agreement recited that 
while the lease provided that plaintiffs may elect to dispose 
of their 25 per cent share of the crops through Bass, plaintiffs 
agreed that they have "this day _sold their share" to Stokely. 
The asparagus contracts were executed with the subordina-
tion agreement and signed by Bass, plaintiffs and Stokely. 
They state that Bass and plaintiffs have "sold" and Stokely 
"has bought for the season 1947 to 1955," inclusive, the 
asparagus "which is growing or which" Bass and plaintiffs 
agre(;l to grow upon the property. Detailed provisions are 
made including a promise in paragraph seven that ''during 
the life of" the contract, plaintiffs and Bass will cultivate 
and care for the "asparagus beds" in a prudent manner. 
The judgment declared 'the asparagus contracts to be in full 
force and effect and Stokely to become the owner of the crops 
to be grown. Plaintiffs urge that the court erred in decicl-
ing that Bass and plaintiffs sold the crop to Stokely because 
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Bass, as lessee, had title to it under the lease and plaintiffs 
were entitled to only 25 per cent thereof as rental (see Sil-
veim v. Ohrn, 33 Cal.2d 272 [201 P.2d 387]) and therefore 
it could not have been intended that Stokely was bound by 
paragraph seven of the asparagus contracts. The language 
in paragraph seven, however, is specific and clear as above 
seen. Indeed, it may well be inferred, i:E plaintiffs 1 argu-
ment is accepted, that it was intended that plaintiffs must 
abide by that paragraph at a time when Bass would no longer 
have title to the crop, that is, after the lease was terminated, 
thus indicating that the termination of the lease was not to 
d~stroy Stokely's rights. 
[7] Plaintiffs urge various other asserted ambiguities in 
the asparagus contracts when read with the other instruments, 
such as that plaintiffs could not have been the seller of the 
crop al).d pass title thereto when they did not have it, and 
the statement that there were no encumbrances on the crops 
when there were. These factors do not compel us to ignore 
the .clear and positive provisions of the contracts which are 
reasonably susceptible of the interpretation placed thereon 
by the trial court. 
[6b] The contracts died with the lease, argue plaintiffs, 
because the Knox letter written during the preliminary ne-
gotiations referred to the purchase of the crops to be grown 
during the term of the lease. .As we have seen, however, 
that is not the necessary construction of the subordination 
agreement and the asparagus contracts are expressly made 
to run to 1955. 
[8] Plaintiffs claim the court erred in concluding that 
Stokely may retain 75 per cent of the amounts to be paid 
by it for asparagus under the asparagus contracts until it 
has been reimbursed for Bass 1 indebtedness to it in the sum 
of $47,893.19. This is the legal effect of the conclusion of 
law in the judgment that Stokely ~:!as a lien on the crops to 
secure .that indebtedness, and it follows that it should receive 
the proceeds from the crops until it is paid. 
[9] Plaintiffs assert that the refinancing arrangement con-
sisting of the crop mortgage, subordination agreement and 
asparagus contracts as interpreted by the trial court is un-
fair and unconscionable ; and that a lien cannot be equitably 
imposed to enforce them. beyond the term of the lease be-
cause plaintiffs get nothing out of it and the benefits all lie 
with Stokely. To that end they urge that Stokely gets: (1) 
May 1952j EBERHARDT v. BASS 
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The right to the asparagus crops to be grown under the 
asparagus contracts; (2) Bass' promissory notes; ( 3) a crop. 
mortgage on 75 per cent of the crops; (4) a discount on the 
Bass indebtedness of $14,000; (5) a chattel mortgage on Bass' 
farming equipment; ( 6) an assignment of Bass' lease ; and 
(7) security rights under the subordination agreement. With 
regard to (1) the contracts assured to plaintiffs the current 
market price for the crops. As to Bass' notes, Stokely paid 
the original mortgagee, Richmond-Chase, and any benefit 
that would accrue by a reduction in the debt would be to 
make the debt less. The assignment of the lease was some-
thing that came from Bass, not plaintiffs. The essence of 
plaintiffs' argument seems to be that, as interpreted by the 
court, the refinancing arrangement imposed upon the aspar-
agus crop and property, liens for an obligation incurred by 
MacLean and Bass, not plaintiffs, and for a period beyond 
the termination of the lease for Bass' default; that for having 
their property encumbered by that obligation they received 
nothing. They did receive value, however, when we look 
at the whole transaction. The original indebtedness was in-
curred to establish the perennial asparagus plants and bring 
them to a producing stage. That was a benefit to plaintiffs' 
land, rendering it productive of valuable crops of which they 
were to receive 25 per cent. In 1947, by the refinancing ar-
rangement, the debt became less and the asparagus contracts 
were made to assure plaintiffs and Bass of a certain market. 
Certainly plaintiffs 'were benefited by having a properly 
financed lessee who would carry out the lease. When the 
refinancing arrangement was made it may be assumed that 
the parties believed the value of the crops would pay for 
their care and cultivation and still leave a profit. The termi-
nation of the lease would not necessary alter that situation, 
for it would only change the personnel of the one who cared 
for and harvested the crops. If defendants performed that 
function they would realize any profit Bass would have 
made. The fact remains that the crops were assumed to be 
!1 .benefit · to all concerned and they were made possible by 
the ·money advanced. 
· To ·plaintiffs' contention that the lien should not have 
been imposed, it is clear from the foregC?ing disc~sion that 
the prop~lj;y wa~ to be security for the indeptedness under 
the· refinancing instruments. The court did· nothing more 
than declare their effect. 
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It is claimed that there is no allegation or finding that the 
refinancing arrangement was fair and plaintiffs received 
· Yalue. The transactions were fully set forth in Stokely's 
pleadings and the findings of the court and 've do not see how 
plaintiffs were prejudiced by failure to set forth more. 
Judgment affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J ., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., 
Schauer, J ., and Spence, J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 22263. In Bank. May 13, 1952.] 
LYMAN D. PFINGSTEN, Respondent, v. ROBERT E. 
WESTENHA VER, as Administrator, etc., Appellant. 
[1] Conflict of Laws-Rules of Evidence.- Law of forum controls 
the rules of evidence, including the question of its suf-
ficiency. 
[2] Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Sufficiency of Evidence. 
-Where there is any evidence which sustains an implied 
finding of the jury, its determination is final. 
[3] Automobiles-Evidence-Collisions.-Evidence that automo-
bile of defendant's decedent was traveling at a high rate 
of speed on a treacherously icy highway, that brakes were 
applied under conditions conducive to skidding, and that 
the headlight beams of the automobile suddenly swung at 
an angle to the previous line of travel and a collision with 
plaintiff's tractor-trailer occ111·red, sustains implied finding of 
jury that driver of automobile was negligent and that his 
negligence was the cause of the collision. 
[4] Evidence-Hearsay.-Testimony of plaintiff's witness as to 
ownership o.f automobile which collided with plaintiff's tractor-
trailer may not be excluded as hearsay where the witness 
testifies from · his own knowledge (Code Civ. Proc., § 1845) , 
a1;1d it does not appear how he acquired his knowledge. 
[1] See Am.Jur., Conflict of Laws, § 203. 
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mobiles, § 242; [8] Evidence, ·§ 457; [9] Evidence, § 453; [10, 11, 
14, 16] Damages, § 182; [12] Automobiles, § 189-1; [13] Automo-
biles, § 272; [15, 17, 18, 20] Automobiles, § 360; [19] Automo-
biles, § 385-1; [21] Damages, § 171; [22] Trial, § 204; [23] Ap-
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